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MICROAGGRESSIONS, QUESTIONABLE SCIENCE,
AND FREE SPEECH
Edward Cantu & Lee Jussim, Ph.D*
Abstract
The topic of microaggressions is hot currently. Diversity
administrators
regularly
propagate
lists
of
alleged
microaggressions and express confidence that listed items reflect
what some psychologists claim they do: racism that is, at the very
least, unconscious in the mind of the speaker. Legal academics are
increasingly leveraging microaggression research in theorizing law
and proposing legal change. But how scientifically legitimate are
claims by some psychologists about what acts constitute
microaggressions? The authors—one a law professor, the other a
psychologist—argue that the answer is “not much.” In this article,
the authors dissect the studies, and critique the claims, of
microaggression researchers. They then explore the ideological
glue that seems to hold the current microaggression construct
together, and that best explains its propagative success. They close
by warning of the socially caustic and legally pernicious effects the
current microaggression construct can cause if academics,
administrators, and the broader culture continue to subscribe to it
without healthy skepticism. (Word Count: 12,937)
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INTRODUCTION
As a law professor, one of us was recently required by his
institution
to
complete
an
“unconscious
bias
and
microaggressions” training program. Among the training handouts
was a list of statements and questions that apparently constitute
“microaggressions.” The form asked whether the reader had ever
done any of the following: “made the statement ‘I don’t see color”;
“I have complained that someone or something is too ‘PC’”; or I
have asked “a person of color to explain something about their
culture.”1 According to some psychologists, an affirmative answer
to any of these items amounted to an admission of having
expressed at least unconscious racism.
Simply put, microaggressions are acts, often facially
innocuous, that convey subtle animus or bias against someone in a
traditionally marginalized group. For simplicity’s sake, we will
refer herein exclusively to spoken microaggressions that allegedly
communicate racial bias.2 Combating microaggressions is part of a
greater project of rooting out the purportedly most insidious forms
of racism today: the subtle forms embedded in culture that we take
for granted, such as language habits that reinforce pernicious racial
stereotypes.
Microaggressions are increasingly the focus of social justice

1

Microaggression Checklist (on file with author).
Researchers claim that microaggressions can take non-verbal forms; for
example, behavioral or environmental forms. Further, while people from all
marginalized groups can experience microaggressions, again, for ease of
discussion, we limit our focus to those that are allegedly inspired by racism.
2

2
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discourse, legal scholarship, and administrative programing. 3 In
2015 the Global Language Monitor ranked “microaggression” the
“top word of the year” given the term’s increasing prevalence in
discourse.4 Microaggressions are increasingly the basis for charges
against professors and others who, for example, correct students’
spelling and grammar in grading papers,5 an act that commonly
appears on lists of alleged microaggressions. And at Emory
University, students have formally demanded that student
evaluation forms include fields wherein students can report
microaggressions committed by professors. 6
But what is the basis for labeling any of the preceding items
microaggressions? How do researchers even know what acts count
as microaggressions? Many would assume that the social scientists
who study and publish scholarship on the phenomenon have
already answered these questions to a degree that makes the
current microaggression construct valid. But have they? The
3

See, e.g., Andrew Limbong, Microaggressions Are A Big Deal: How To Talk
Them Out And When To Walk Away, NPR, June 9, 2020, available at:
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/08/872371063/microaggressions-are-a-big-dealhow-to-talk-them-out-and-when-to-walk-away; See also Kristen Rogers, Dear
Anti-Racist Allies: Here's How to Respond to Microaggressions, CNN, June 6,
2020,
available
at:
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/05/health/racialmicroaggressions-examples-responses-wellness/index.html; Ronald Wheeler,
Diversity Dialogues . . .: About Microaggressions, 108 LAW LIBR. J. 321 (2016);
Elizabeth B. Cooper, The Appearance of Professionalism, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1
(2019); Eden B. King, Whitney Botsford Morgan, Dana G. Dunleavy, Katie
Elder, & Raluca Graebner, Discrimination in the 21st Century: Are Science and
the Law Aligned?, 17 PSYCH. PUB. POL. AND L. 54 (2011) (discussing “the
construct of microaggressions with the goal of extending this theoretical lens to
the workplace.”); Anastasia M. Boles, 48 N.M. L. REV. 145, 168 (2019) (“When
a microaggressor comments "I don't see color," the hidden message is "I do not
recognize your unique cultural experience and background," not "I am not
racist."); id. at 170 (“Legal scholarship has also explored the ways
macroaggressions and microaggressions affect legal education.”).
4
Microaggression is the Top Word of the Year for Global English 2015, THE
GLOBAL LANGUAGE MONITOR, Dec. 27, 2015, available at:
https://languagemonitor.com/global-english/microaggression-is-the-top-wordof-the-year-for-global-english-2015/
5
See Sam Hoff, Students Defend Professor After Sit-In Over Racial Climate,
DAILY
BRUIN,
Nov.
20,
2013,
available
at:
https://dailybruin.com/2013/11/20/students-defend-professor-after-sit-in-overracial-climate (“Rust said students in the demonstration described grammar and
spelling corrections he made on their dissertation proposals as a form of
‘microaggression.’”).
6
Catherine Sevcenko, Emory Students Demand Course Evaluations Include
Rating for Microaggressions, FIRE NEWSDESK Dec. 11, 2015, available at:
https://www.thefire.org/emory-students-demand-course-evaluations-includerating-for-microaggressions/

3
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answer should inform the degree to which legal scholars and
university administrators can responsibly incorporate the current
microaggression construct into legal scholarship or diversity
training materials. By “current microaggression construct”
(hereafter CMC), we mean the current definition of
microaggressions and the set of claims microaggression
researchers make about them, the most important of which are
claims about what acts count as microaggressions and why.
While interdisciplinarity has greatly enriched the collective
corpus of legal scholarship over the past several decades, it comes
with its risks. One risk is that, after some claim becomes a popular
research topic in another field, but before research establishes that
claim as valid, it will take off like wildfire in legal scholarship
without sufficient gatekeeping. This is what has happened with
microaggressions: educators, scholars, and administrators have
accepted the CMC as valid even though psychologists have not
established its scientific legitimacy.
The possible reasons for this are manifold. First, academics
and administrators may have a willingness to accept a claim at face
value because they deem the concept to be useful—ideologically,
for example—such that confirmation bias cancels vigilance. More
charitably, many people outside the field of psychology simply
make the mistake of assuming that peer-reviewed publication of a
social science idea means the idea has by definition been
thoroughly vetted scientifically.
This mistake is easy to make. But psychologists have a long
and embarrassing history of canonizing claims that have turned out
to be false, a situation that has come to be known in psychology as
“the replication crisis.”7 In short, it is a mistake to believe that,
7

Jussim, L., Krosnick, J.A., Stevens, S. T. & Anglin, S. M., A Social
Psychological Model of Scientific Practices: Explaining Research Practices and
Outlining the Potential for Scientific Reforms, 59 PSYCHOLOGICA BELGICA 353
(2019). Many may be shocked to discover that independent researchers are
generally only able to replicate the results of about one third of all biomedical
and psychological science studies. Allen, C. & Mehler, D. M. A., Open Science
Challenges, Benefits and Tips in Early Career and Beyond, 17 PLOS BIOLOGY,
(2019)
available
at:
https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.3000246.
This means there is currently no reason to give particular credence to the claims
or conclusions of any single published claim merely by virtue of peer-review
publication. The difficulty of establishing the validity of new alleged discoveries
in the social sciences is often not readily apparent to those lacking the
disciplinary expertise necessary to critically evaluate them. This problem is
exacerbated by recent findings that many public misunderstandings of
psychological research stem less from bad reporting or science writing than
from scientists themselves overstating and overselling their findings to reporters

4
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merely because an idea appears frequently in academic
publications, it constitutes scientific fact. Often, it is only after
withstanding decades of skeptical vetting that a new scientific
claim can be established with a reasonable level of certainty.
After reviewing scholarship in which psychologists attempt to
confirm the legitimacy of the CMC, and in which they debate the
issue with dissenting psychologists, we conclude that the current
operationalization of the CMC in social justice discourse, legal
scholarship, and education administration is significantly
unwarranted. We are also concerned about how the current
propagation of the CMC, given its lack of adequate bases and
therefore its limited utility, might have the primary effect of
proving socially caustic—and therefore counterproductive in the
quest for social justice—without countervailing benefits.
Therefore, we recommend that scholars and administrators—
and everyone else for that matter—generally refrain from relying
on commonly propagated lists of microaggressions as reflecting
anything meaningful, at least until psychologists perform the
significant amount of empirical work left to be done to render the
CMC scientifically valid and useful.
In Part I, we begin by defining and dissecting the
microaggression concept. We will then argue that researchers’ core
claim about microaggressions—that alleged microaggressions
contain embedded racist messages—is without basis. In Part II, we
discuss what appears to us to be the “methodological activism” that
drives much of the debate over the legitimacy of the CMC and that
gives rise to the scientific weakness of it. In short, we argue that
the CMC appears to be designed primarily to reinforce a critical
race theory narrative about social reality. In Part III, we discuss
what we believe to be the primary costs of the CMC’s problematic
propagation, with a focus on the free speech and social health
implications in higher education environments.
I.

Microaggressions: Dissection and Analysis

To appreciate what researchers claim about microaggressions,
and to understand our critiques of the CMC, a nuanced
understanding of what researchers mean by the term is essential.
This section is devoted to dissecting the concept and highlighting
how that dissection reveals that researchers’ claims about
and to an unsuspecting public. Sumner, P. et al., Exaggerations and Caveats in
Press Releasese and Health-Related Science News. 11 PLOS ONE (2016),
available
at:
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0168217.
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microaggressions are without adequate scientific basis.
A. Dissecting the Concept
The term microaggression was coined by Harvard
psychologist Chester Pierce in 1970. He defined the term to mean
“Black-White racial interactions [that] are characterized by White
put-downs, done in an automatic, preconscious, or unconscious
fashion.”8 Before 2007, it seems scholars perceived
microaggressions as a relatively narrow set of acts that were more
facially problematic than items on expanded microaggression lists
common today in psychology studies and diversity training
materials.
Pierce gave examples such as a White man saying to a Black
man “we’re good to you Blacks,” which in the early 1970s
translated, according to Pierce, to “[w]e're good to you Blacks and
you should be grateful that we control you as gingerly and
humanely as we do.”9 Similarly, writing in 2002, Daniel
Solorzano, et al., provided as examples of microaggressions items
such as “"[w]hen I talk about those Blacks, I really wasn't talking
about you” and “"If only there were more of them like you." 10
But in 2007, Psychologist Derald Wing Sue brought
microaggressions back into the scholarly mainstream. He is the
psychologist most credited for the current, significantly broadened
microaggression construct. He has defined racial microaggressions
as “brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, or
environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional,
that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and
insults toward people of color.”11
Sue asserts that minorities don’t “just occasionally experience
racial microaggressions.” Rather, “they are a constant, continuing,
and cumulative experience” in their lives.12 Sue has included as
8

Chester M. Pierce, PSYCHIATRIC PROBLEMS OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY IN
AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, 512, 515 (1974).
9
C. M. Pierce, OFFENSIVE MECHANISMS, IN THE BLACK SEVENTIES, 265, 275
(1970).
10
Daniel Solorzano, Walter R. Allen, & Grace Carroll, Keeping Race in Place:
Racial Microaggressions and Campus Racial Climate at the University of
California Berkeley, 23 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 15, 24 (2002).
11
Sue, D. W., Capodilupo, C. M., Torino, G. C., Bucceri, J. M., Holder, A.,
Nadal, K. L., & Esquilin, M., Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life:
Implications for Clinical Practice, 62 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, 271, 273
(2007).
12
Derald Wing Sue, Racial Microaggressions and the Power to Define Reality,
63 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 277, 277-78 (2008).

6
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microaggressions items such as “America is a melting pot,” which,
according to Sue, has the embedded meaning that a White speaker
“does not want to acknowledge race” and that minorities should
“assimilate” and “acculturate to the dominant culture.”13
Reactions from some psychologists were at times critical, with
one psychologist terming Sue’s argument “macrononsense.” 14 But
in general Sue’s 2007 article inspired a large body of psychological
research leveraging and expanding on Sue’s idea; the result is the
CMC. Along with Sue’s definition of microaggressions, other
prominent scholars offer theirs; all of them roughly parallel each
other. For example, Monnica Williams, a prominent
microaggression researcher, defines them “on the basis of Pierce’s
original descriptions and current scholarship,” as “deniable acts of
racism that reinforce pathological stereotypes and inequitable
social norms.”15
Included in the appendix is a list of microaggressions taken
from diversity training materials at a major U.S. university. As a
glance at some of the items on the list reveals, it is not hard to
believe that racism can manifest in relatively less blatant and overt
forms, or that racism can be expressed unconsciously. For
example, the more facially problematic expressions on the list such
as “you’re a credit to your race” are arguably examples of
statements reasonably deemed as likely rooted in racism (rough
translation: “your race is unimpressive, but you’re one of the few
good ones”). So, importantly, we do not deny that
microaggressions happen; the concept of “microaggressions,” at
least generically, has some validity and describes a real
phenomenon.
But the CMC goes far beyond items as facially problematic as
the above example. Specifically, the sheer breadth of acts that are
13

Sue, et al., Everyday Life, supra n. 11 at 276.
See, e.g., Kenneth R. Thomas, Macrononsense in Multiculturalism, 63
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 274 (2008) (describing “much” of the contents of an
early Sue article on microaggressions as “pure nonsense”); Rafael S. Harris Jr.,
Racial Microaggresssion? How Do You Know? 63 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST
275, 276 (2008) (questioning Sue’s certainty about having been microaggressed
against by an airline flight attendant, and asking “What if Sue’s ‘experiential
reality’ is not real yet is espoused in paper presentations and professional articles
as if it is so? The dissemination of biases and self-interests would be a tragic
twist to both multicultural psychology’s mission and the American
Psychological Association’s expressed interest in advancing psychology as an
evidence-based science.”).
15
Monnica T. Williams, Microaggressions: Clarification, Evidence, and Impact,
15 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, 3, 4, available at:
https://www.psycharchives.org/bitstream/20.500.12034/2130/1/Williams_Micro
aggressionsPPS-inpress.pdf
14
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commonly included in lists of microaggressions, and the lack of an
adequate basis for that breadth, raises serious concerns about the
propriety of basing policy or education administration on current
microaggression research. The problems with the CMC, we argue,
are that (1) psychologists have hereto provided no valid basis for
labeling a vast majority of alleged microaggressions as such; (2)
that the CMC is nevertheless currently being operationalized as if
it were the product of rigorous science; and (3) that the nature of
the CMC has the effect of stigmatizing and perhaps silencing those
who do not share the ideological assumptions of microaggression
researchers.
We turn first to what we believe is the most serious
problem with the CMC: researchers establish that certain acts are
microaggressions simply by claiming them to be so, without any
scientific basis to support their claims.
B. Embedded Racist Meanings?
There is little to no basis for academics and administrators to
responsibly accept commonly propagated lists of microaggressions
as reflecting actual microaggressions. A discussion of the relevant
research, and the problems therein, reveals why.
We are not the first to raise serious questions about the
integrity of research establishing the CMC. In addition to the
critics mentioned above, the late psychologist Scott Lilienfeld has
been a major critic of the CMC for what he believed to be the
“inadequate evidence” for the “strong claims” researchers make
about microaggressions.16 He concluded that the CMC “is not even
close to being ready for widespread real-world application.” 17 One
of the numerous weaknesses Lilienfeld identified in the CMC is
the fact that “there is no research evidence that the
microaggressions identified by [researchers] are linked, either
probabilistically or inexorably, to [the] negative messages” 18
researchers claim are embedded in them.
Microaggression researchers’ fundamental challenge is one
they so far have failed to meet: they have not provided sound
scientific bases for labeling as microaggressions most of the items
they so label. This failing is the result of a problematic, yet
necessary, aspect of their construct: in determining what acts count
as microaggressions, researchers depend fundamentally on a
16

Scott O. Lilienfeld, Microaggressions: Strong Claims, Inadequate Evidence,
12 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, 138, 163 (2017).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 146.

8
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metaphysical ascription of racist meaning to often facially
innocuous acts and language.
Importantly, according to microaggression researchers,
microaggressions are not merely insensitive acts that should be
avoided lest people of color (POC) misinterpret them as racist.
Rather, researchers argue that listed microaggressive items have
intrinsically embedded racist meanings, notwithstanding the nonracist intent of the speaker or the lack of malign interpretation by
the recipient. As such, the legitimacy of lists of microaggressions
depends on researchers being able to divine objectively racist
meaning in facially innocuous acts that others cannot detect. And
the propagative success of the CMC has relied on the public
believing that researchers are able to do just this. This assumed
ability to discern hidden forces and essences in social phenomena
is now common in social justice discourse and critical academic
theory.19
Assertions by psychologist Monnica Williams, who is one of
the leading defenders of the CMC, and whose work will thus be of
focus in our attempt to crystalize the CMC, help bring the problem
into relief. Williams, in responding to Lilienfeld’s criticisms, has
explained that whether a statement, such as “America is a melting
pot,” is a microaggression “is not based on the conscious intent of
the offender or the perception of the target.” 20 “Microaggressions
are real and not simply a subjective experience.”21 Rather,
“microaggressions are, by nature, offensive in the sense that they
are a form of racism . . . .”22 Where a speaker commits a
microaggressive act in certain contexts, those acts are inherently
and at least unconsciously racist because they “by definition [are]
caused by socially conditioned racial biases and prejudices.” 23
They “function as a form of oppression designed to reinforce the
traditional power differentials between groups, whether or not this
was the conscious intention the offender.” 24
Because the subjective intent and interpretation of the speaker
and recipient, respectively, do not determine whether a statement is
a microaggression, when a speaker speaks a microaggression they,
19

Sociologist Jason Manning argues that this tendency has a problematic kinship
with voodoo. Lee Jussim, "Hidden Forces and Essences": Psychology as Magic,
PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY,
Feb.
22,
2018,
available
at:
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/rabble-rouser/201802/hidden-forcesand-essences-psychology-magic
20
Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15 at 3.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
23
Id. at 6.
24
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
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at least negligently, direct or “aim” a sonic packet of objectively
extant coded racism toward the recipient. Consistent with this,
other psychologists, such as Kanter, et al., argue that
microaggressions are “rooted in”25 racist beliefs. Similarly, Sue
explains that “microaggressions . . . contain both a conscious
communication and hidden or metacommunication that is outside
the level of perpetrator awareness.”26 Thus, “the power of racial
microaggressions lies in their invisibility to the perpetrator and,
oftentimes, the recipient.”27
The question then arises: how do researchers know that
alleged microaggressions have embedded in them racist messages?
Where is the evidence, for example, that racism is the font from
which questions such as “can I touch your hair?” stem? Such
evidence simply does not exist.
For example, imagine a White student and a Black student are
lab partners in college, and the White student asks her partner
“how did you get so good at science?” (hereafter “the Question”).
This question in context (researchers do at times stress the
importance of context) is an example of a microaggression
according to Williams and Sue.28 So, it is allegedly an “act of
racism.” Microaggression researchers attribute to the Question
“assumptions about intelligence, competence, or status” on the
basis of race. In other words, the alleged embedded meaning of the
Question is roughly: “how can a Black person be so good at
25

Kanter, et al., Jonathan W. Kanter, Monnica T. Williams, Adam M.
Kuczynski1, Katherine E. Manbeck, Marlena Debreaux, Daniel C. Rosen, A
Preliminary Report on the Relationship Between Microaggressions Against
Black People and Racism Among White College Students Race, 9 Race SOC.
PROBL. 291 (2017).
26
Derald Wing Sue, Sarah Alsaidi, Michael N. Awad, Elizabeth Glaeser,
Cassandra Z. Calle, & Narolyn Mendez, Disarming Racial Microaggressions:
Microintervention Strategies for Targets, White Allies, and Bystanders, 74
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, 128, 135 (2019).
27
Sue, et al., Everyday Life, supra n. 11, at 275. See also Kristen Rogers, Dear
anti-racist allies: Here's How to Respond to Microaggressions, CNN, June 6,
2020,
available
at:
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/05/health/racialmicroaggressions-examples-responses-wellness/index.html. In an interview with
Sue, the CNN writer notes: “Microaggressions have two parts: One is the
conscious communication of the initiator, which was likely intended to be a
surface-level compliment. Then there's the unconscious metacommunication,
which is the message the microaggression sends.” While it is latent independent
meaning that qualifies an act as a microaggression, researchers sometimes use
language that suggests that a recipient’s interpretation is definitionally
important. For example, Kanter, et al. assert that “the experiential reality of
group members experiencing microaggressions is foundational to the definition
and conceptualization of the construct.” Kanter, et al., supra n. 24, at 292.
28
Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 16.
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science?”29
The initial response is obvious: it is at least as plausible that
the speaker simply believes that, race aside, her partner is
remarkably good at science, and thus that no unconscious
stereotype about Black people inspired the Question. 30 Why should
this not be deemed the default embedded meaning rather than a
racist meaning? To be sure, the Question might be an expression of
racism. But recall that the claim is not that the Question could be
inspired by racism, or that it causes discomfort (though researchers
claim this too), but rather that, according to Williams, the question
in context “by nature” is inspired by racism, either consciously or
unconsciously. Williams rejects the possibility that “certain
microaggression items reflect innocuous statements or actions that
do not stem from implicit racial biases.”31 Why? Researchers
provide no meaningful evidence to support the notion that the
Question, by its nature and in context, stems from racial bias. It is
just assumed. Of course, science is, in principle, open to
demonstrating that all sorts of seemingly implausible things are
true, and it provides mechanisms for such demonstration.
Notwithstanding, the evidence to support the claim of intrinsic
racism is non-existent.
Such evidence is conceivably obtainable. Researchers would
need to: (1) assess levels of racism among a group of Whites; (2)
assess whether those levels of racism perfectly or very
substantially correlate with the likelihood of microaggression
commission; and (3) rule out alternative explanations for the
commission of alleged microaggressions. Nothing provided so far
by microaggression researchers comes close to meeting this
threshold. Rather, researchers seem to simply assume the
respective embedded meanings, and therefore declare statements
and questions to be microaggressions essentially by fiat.
Of course, the assumption of embedded racist meanings is not
stated as an assumption, but a reliance on intuitive assumptions is
what researchers’ methodology in this regard seems to boil down
to.
To start with, Sue, et al., in the original 2007 article bringing
29

Id. (noting that this microaggression reflects “assumptions about intelligence,
competence, or status”).
30
Though a speaker should apparently not raise this defense, as a “denial from
the offender” can cause “social harm.” Id. at 7. In fact, later Williams compares
microaggression “offenders” who deny racist intentions to Ku Klux Klan
members who have similarly denied their racism, but rather assert they only
“want to defend White heritage.” Id. at 9.
31
Id. at 6.
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the microaggression concept back into the psychological
mainstream, provided a list of microaggressions that has been
highly influential in the drafting of commonly propagated lists.
Yet, the authors did not determine that the listed items were in fact
microaggressions. They merely (to their credit) stated that the
items “may potentially be classified as racial microaggressions.32
However, as Lilienfeld stated, “it is troubling that the original Sue
et al. . . . taxonomy of microaggressions, which was generated in
an armchair fashion, has been used as a template in virtually all
research articles in the [CMC] literature.” 33 Consistent with the
apparent armchair fashion of this list’s drafting, Sue, et al., go on
to assign “hidden messages” to the listed items. 34
Following Sue et al.’s 2007 article, researchers began using a
focus group methodology to generate lists of microaggressions.
Under this method, POC study participants are placed in small
discussion groups to discuss microaggressions they believe they
have suffered. These reports are used to generate new items on
microaggression lists.35 Of course, this methodology simply makes
the study participants’ intuition controlling rather than the
researchers’, but the problem remains: this subjective selfreporting is clearly insufficient for showing that listed
microaggressive items have objectively embedded in them racist
messages.36 It merely demonstrates that some POC suspect such
subtle racism is at play when hearing some listed
microaggressions.
Consistent with this methodology, Williams has responded to
calls for greater evidence of embedded racist meanings with
invocation of her “lived experience”:
Lilienfeld argued that there is no evidence that the
32

Sue, et al., Everyday Life, supra n. 11, at 275 (emphasis added)
Lilienfeld, Strong Claims, supra n. 16, at 149.
34
Sue, et al., Everyday Life, supra n. 11, at 275.
35
See, e.g., Derald Wing Sue, Christina M. Capodilupo, & Aisha M. B. Holder,
Racial Microaggressions in the Life Experience of Black Americans,
PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE, 329, 331 (Black
participants were asked questions about their experiences with subtle racism,
with the goal of “generat[ing] a variety of microaggressive examples.”).
36
And, as Lilienfeld has noted, “[a] potentially serious concern with this
methodology is that most focus groups have been drawn from highly selected
samples, many or all of whom are already predisposed to endorse the concept of
microaggressions.” Lilienfeld, Strong Claims, supra n. 16, at 149. For example,
the study just discussed “included only [participants] who agreed that subtle
discrimination in the form of racial microaggressions exists.” See, e.g., Sue, et
al, Black Americans, supra n. 35, at 334.
33
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commission of microaggressions is related to racial
prejudice. Admittedly, those of us who study
microaggressions have not felt a need to prove this
because the connection between racism and
microaggressions appears evident through our
research and lived experiences.”37
In short, the methodology generally employed to generate lists
of microaggressions has been to simply ask POC or other
psychologists (“diversity experts” for example) to think of ways in
which racism can subtly manifest in language, then to generate
examples of statements or questions that they intuitively conclude
reflect this subtle racism. The problem with this methodology
should be obvious: how do we know the respondents are correct?
In response to critics highlighting this problem, Williams has
responded suggesting that this complaint is a red-herring, and that
identifying microaggressions is more simple than critics claim. In
response to the claim that researchers simply by fiat declare
alleged microaggressions to contain racist messages, Williams
responded that the “cardinal considerations of a microaggression
are these: (1) Does the behavior reinforce pathological stereotypes
or promote exclusion?; (b) Is it easy to explain away as not being
due to race? If the answers to both are yes, then we have a
microaggression.”38 There are several blatant problems with this
response.
First, notice that Williams’ first prong centralizes the effects
of behavior, but elsewhere she definitionally centralizes a state of
mind on the part of the speaker: at the very least, unconscious
racism. To be more consistent with her prior assertions, one would
expect prong (1) to read “is the speaker committing an act with at
least the unconscious intent of reinforcing pathological
stereotypes?” This is especially the case given that prong (2)
focuses on whether the speaker could explain the act away as not
being due to race. What would the speaker need to “explain away”
if prong (1) focuses only on effects? The phrase “not being due to
race” only makes sense if Williams is referring to the speaker’s
motivation. So, which is it? Is it effects or state of mind that makes
an act a microaggression?
Second, and most damningly, if we focus on effects, notice
how Williams’ new formulation rebegs the same vexing questions.
37

Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 12.
Williams, M. T., Psychology Cannot Afford to Ignore the Many Harms
Caused by Microaggressions, 15 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE,
38, 39 (2020).
38
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For example, imagine students are in a study session in which
they’re discussing current events, and a White student says “all
lives matter, not just Black lives,” a microaggression according to
Williams.39 This statement may be obnoxious to some, but how do
researchers know that this “reinforce[s] pathological stereotypes?”
Of course, anything is conceivable, but this is beside the point.
Williams provides no meaningful answer that this is the necessary
effect. She merely suggests that, to find out, “people should
educate themselves on subtle prejudice in America and the life
experiences of those from different ethnic groups.”40 But other than
a citation to a study that, as discussed below, provides no
substantial support for her argument, Williams leaves it at that, and
therefore fails to meaningfully respond to the challenge of critics.
Indeed, she at times seems to imply that other psychologists should
simply believe her because she’s a diversity expert. But this, of
course, doesn’t count as evidence. Rather, it resembles a
declaration by fiat that what she claims is true is in fact true, the
very criticism she was attempting to disarm in providing the above
formulation.
Third, Williams’ formulation proves another point she was
contesting. She was responding to, among other things,
Lilienfeld’s assertion that the CMC has “excessively open
boundaries” given that there doesn’t seem to be a principled way
of determining what qualifies as a microaggression. Prong (b)
suggests that the more an act can possibly be motivated by nonracial factors the more it qualifies as a microaggression. But a vast
majority of statements possible in the English language meet this
standard. Thus, this prong, combined with the elusiveness of how
the first prong is satisfied, helps reveal how the breadth of acts
qualifying as microaggressions is breathtakingly vast and
indeterminate.
So the problem remains: microaggression researchers, no
matter how many times they respond to criticism, seem to be
unable to substantiate their designation of listed acts as
microaggressions consistent with their own definitions of the
phenomenon. The intractability—and the significantly discrediting
nature—of this evidentiary problem with the CMC is highlighted
when one engages in steelmanning attempts to reconstruct the
methodology of the CMC in order to ground the relevant
conclusions in something measureable and verifiable.

39
40

Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 16.
Williams, Cannot Afford, supra n. 38, at 39.
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1.

Methodological
Reconstruction:
Appraisals of POC

Subjective

A first attempt at this exercise might definitionally center how
POC experience alleged microaggressive acts. That is, even though
this is generally not how researchers proceed, suppose the
interpretations of acts by people of color are deemed authoritative
as to the objective embedded meanings of facially innocuous
language (of course, this approach would raise a host of problems,
but let’s put this aside for now). After all, as discussed above,
Kanter, et al., assert that “the experiential reality” of POC is
“foundational to the definition” of microaggressions.”41 Similarly,
Sue explains that part of his project is to validate the “experiential
reality” of people of color by shifting the “power to define reality”
from Whites to POC who perceive embedded racism in alleged
microaggressive acts.42 So some of the researchers’ language, taken
in isolation, can support this recipient-centered approach.
Using this tentative methodology, let’s revisit the lab partner
Question above: “how did you get so good at science?” One
response to our challenge about the Question might be that 53% of
Black participants in a study by Michaels, et al., (along with
Williams) believed The Question to be at least “slightly racist” in
context.43 The study, discussed further later, attempted to
determine if White and Black participants tend to agree on what
acts are offensive. As part of this effort, the researchers first
generated a list of microaggressions and asked Black participants
how racist they thought the various items were.
Again, 53% of the Black participants thought the Question
was at least “slightly” racist. But on its face this is extremely weak
evidence of racist embedded meaning.
First, putting this first significant problem aside, what do we
make of the damning fact that 47% of Black students disagreed
and thought The Question was not at all racist, not even “slightly”?
Isn’t this meaningful evidence that attributing inherent racism to
the Question in context is unwarranted? Williams speculates that
perhaps those in the 47% are less intelligent,44 that they “engage in
denial as a coping strategy,” or that they “may be individuals who
41

Kanter, et al., supra n. 24, at 294.
Sue, Black Americans, supra n. 35, at 335.
43
Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 16 (discussing Timothy L. Michaels,
Natalie Gallagher, Michael Crawford, Jonathan W. Kanter, & Monnica T.
Williams, Racial Differences in the Appraisal of Microaggressions Through
Cultural Consensus Modeling, THE BEHAVIOR THERAPIST 314 (2018)
44
Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 11.
42
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simply may not be offended by anything.” 45
Never is the possibility seriously entertained that the Question
is not a microaggression given that about half of POC in the study
determined that it is not. Rather, the 53% is assumed to be correct,
as the racist embedded meaning is treated as a priori. If one is
going to make an argument that “microaggressions can be validly
assessed using respondents’ subjective reports,” 46 one should not at
once dismiss respondents’ subjective reports because those reports
are inconsistent with the preferred conclusion.
Second, if we take the figure at face value, what does it mean
for 53% of Black respondents to consider something “slightly”
racist? Does it mean “hardly anyone who says this is racist”? Does
it mean “everyone who says this is expressing a tiny bit of
racism?” We do not know, as neither Williams’ work nor the
study she references by Michaels, et al., so clarifies. 47 This is
important. Notice we wrote above that 53% of Black participants
found the Question to be “at least slightly racist.” But in the study,
researchers allowed Black participants to rate items as either
“slightly racist” or “very racist.”48 The problem is, we don’t know
how many of this 53% chose to categorize the Question as only
“slightly racist,” as Williams does not reveal the breakdown. As
such, depending on what “slightly racist” means, it very well could
be that most of the Black students in the 53% believed that the
chance of the Question being racist was only slight, or that they
had only a “slight” belief that the Question is racist. 49
45

Id.
Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 13.
47
Michaels, et al., Racial Differences, supra n. 43, at 314.
48
Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 15.
49
The response might be that the Michaels, et al., study accurately generated
microaggressions because the study found “a significant negative correlation
between [B]lack students’ ratings of the statement being racist with [W]hite
students’ ratings of their likelihood of thinking the microaggression.” Michaels,
et al., supra n. 43, at 317. In other words, the more racist Black participants
deemed an item to be, the less likely Whites were to think or express the item.
Does this show that both Whites and Blacks know microaggressions when they
see them? Hardly.
46

The authors seemed to assume that this reflects agreement between Black and
White participants about what constitute microaggressions. But there is no
reason to think this is the case, as the White participants weren’t asked if they
thought items were microaggressions or “intrinsically racist in context” or the
like. They were merely asked how likely they were to say/think the items.
Asking White students whether they thought the items were racist seems to us to
be the obviously best way to show cross-racial understanding of what constitutes
microaggressions, but the researchers didn’t take this route; it’s unclear why.
For obvious reasons, one cannot assume that just because White students would
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These problems plague many other items on Williams’ list of
alleged microaggressions, such as “I don’t see race . . . I see people
for who they really are,” which 73% of the Black participants
found be at least “slightly racist, and “why do Black people listen
to rap music where they always say the n-word,” 66%.
And in any event, it is important not to reify the above figures,
as there have been no rigorous, pre-registered attempts to replicate
this study, and the dismal replication rate of psychological research
strongly suggests that nothing about this study should be accepted
as established until such replications are conducted and found to
confirm this figure. Indeed, there are other major limitations to the
study that suggest it should not be taken at face value. First, it was
conducted with a small sample of 20 Black students, 50 and small
sample studies routinely produce unreliable findings. Second, as
the authors admit, the study focused on “college-aged students
within one region of the United states, a demographic that is
increasingly exposed to diversity training and therefore whose
response[s] may not generalize to older, community or clinical
samples.”51 This is an understatement: if these students’ “diversity
training” included assertions about what statements or acts are
microaggressions, there’s a good chance they were, coming into
the study, already primed to agree with researchers that the listed
items were indeed racist. As such, there are sound reasons to
suspect that this sample of 20 students were, in their responses,
highly unrepresentative of Black Americans in general.
In short, this subjective appraisal methodology does not get
researchers to where they want to land, as no study—neither the
study discussed above nor any either we have found—reliably
demonstrates that POC agree with researchers about what
constitute microaggressions. Or, more to the point, that any
agreement is strong and consistent enough to validate common
lists of microaggressions based on the subjective appraisals of
POC.

refrain from expressing a given item, this is because they understand the item to
be racist. For example, many or most of the White participants might, if asked,
explain their reluctance to say/think an item as inspired by the fact that certain
statements may erroneously be perceived as racist, or may be socially awkward
or insensitive to express, even if not necessarily racist. And in any event, even if
the White students agreed that the items were indeed racist, cross-racial
agreement like this wouldn’t transform the impressionistic hunches of some
Black and White participants into objective fact.
50
Michaels, et al., supra n. 43, at 316.
51
Id. at 319.
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2. Methodological Reconstruction:
with White Racism

Correlation

A second salvaging methodology might be, as we’ve already
suggested, to measure the racism of White study subjects, and
determine if only racist Whites would commit listed
microaggressive items. This is measurable, and a perfect or
overwhelming correlation might suggest embedded racism. In this
vein, Williams invokes a study by Kanter, et al. (including
Williams),52 wherein researchers employed this methodology. As
Williams describes the study, it provides “important empirical
support for something that diversity researchers knew all along—
microaggressive acts are rooted in racist beliefs . . . .” 53 But the
study does no such thing.
The study sought to “document the degree to which
microaggressions reflect objective acts of prejudice.” 54 The authors
ultimately concluded that their study “provide[s] empirical support
that microaggressive acts are rooted in racist beliefs and feelings of
deliverers, and may not be dismissed as simply subjective
perceptions of the target.”55 But the study re-elicits the same
challenges to the CMC that inspired the study in the first place, as
the phrase “rooted in” is doing more work than it can bear. To see
why, a sketch of the study’s methodology is in order.
The researchers first asked Black participants to review
various alleged microaggressions to determine if they believed the
items to be at least “possibly racist.” Students could also score the
items as “somewhat racist” or “very racist.”56 After compiling a list
of microaggressions that at least half of the Black students deemed
to be at least “possibly racist,” the researchers next asked White
participants to review the remaining 30 items and rank how likely
they were to say or think them. Lastly, the researchers measured
the racial hostility of the White participants.
All the usual caveats for small-scale psychology studies apply
once again. This was a small scale study, including only 33 Black
52

Kanter, et al., Preliminary Report, supra n. 25.
Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 12.
54
Kanter, et al., Preliminary Report, supra n. 25, at 292.
55
Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
56
Interestingly, the researchers parred down the list to 30 by eliminating 16
questions that were thought to be microaggressions, but which over half the
Black participants concluded were not at least “possibly racist.” This alone
meaningfully suggests that many items researchers deem microaggressive are
not even “possibly racist,” at least if, as the researchers earlier state, “the
experiential reality” of minorities is “foundational to the definition” of
microaggressions.
53
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and 118 White students, all from a single university. These
numbers are so small and so unrepresentative of any population
that the entire study should be viewed as little more than questionraising. Furthermore, it has never been subjected to attempted
replication by independent scientists. But there are bigger
problems.
First, even if we could take correlations as evidence of
causation, only 10 of 30 correlations reached the conventional
cutoff for “statistical significance”; meaning that 20 of the 30
correlations were statistically indistinguishable from 0. This means
that for 2/3 of the supposed microaggressions, the study effectively
showed no meaningful relationship between White prejudice and a
White participant’s likelihood of expressing it. Importantly, among
the 2/3 of microaggressions that failed to meaningfully correlate
with White racism, most were the very ambiguous items that give
rise to overbreadth challenges to the CMC. In other words, the
facially innocuous items that researchers claim are
microaggressions—the only items that make the CMC allegedly
useful—are the very items the researchers failed to connect with
White racism. One alleged microaggression—I “don’t think of
Black people as Black,” actually correlated with positive attitudes
toward Blacks at .12. Yet it’s still claimed to be a microaggression.
And even if the correlations for all alleged microaggressions
were statistically significant (most weren’t), the study would tell us
very little, notwithstanding the researchers’ claim that the study
supports the notion “that microaggressive acts are rooted in racist
beliefs.” In this hypothetical steelmanning of the study, its primary
revelation would be simply that the more racist someone is, the
more likely they are to say things that POC deem problematic. This
would hardly be surprising. Analytical gymnastics would be
required to conclude from this result that the study provides
meaningful evidence that the respective items are “rooted in”
racism.
To illustrate the point, imagine researchers found that those
who carry pocketknives are 20% more likely to commit acts of
violence than those who don’t carry them. This would reveal
nothing about either the nature of pocketknives, or the nature of the
act of possessing one, since a vast majority of people who carry
pocketknives don’t commit acts of violence against others with
them. Researchers therefore could not credibly conclude with this
data that the possession of a pocketknife is “rooted in” violent
tendencies.
In any event, far from generally validating “the experiences of
those who report being microaggressed against,” the study merely
19
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highlights the inability of researchers thus far to provide
meaningful evidence for their most important premise: that
“microaggressions” are indeed microaggressions.
A second problem with leveraging the Kanter, et al. study is
revealed upon review of the 30 microaggression items reseachers
included in the study. Recall that an item was deemed to be a
microaggression if at least half of Black students deemed it to be at
least “possibly racist.” An example of an item that at least half of
the Black participants found to be “at least possibly racist” is the
following statement made in the following scenerio:
Scenario: [A White person is] with a mixed (Black
and White) group of friends, and [he is] talking
about various current events and political issues,
including police brutality, afﬁrmative action,
unemployment, and education. . . .
Statement by White student: I don’t think of Black
people as Black
A common translation for this type of “colorblindness”
microaggression is something along these lines: “I am not
recognizing your identity-based experiences, challenges, and
needs.”57 But what did the Black study participants think?
Of the Black participants, 33.3% deemed this item “possibly
racist,” and 27.3 deemed it “somewhat or very racist.” Implicative
of the prior discussion, if researchers claim that the statement
above is “rooted in racism,” it is problematic that only 27.3% of
Black participants thought that the chance of this being true was
meaningfully high.
“Possibly racist” is an extremely low threshold, as it can
include items that the participants believed were almost certainly
not racist. Counting the “possibly racist” responses from Black
participants gives the superficial impression that most of them
believed that the 30 items were “rooted in racism.” But the details
of the study reveal that for a majority of the items, Black
participants were more likely to deem them “possibly racist” rather
than “somewhat” or “very” racist. 58
Only 13 of the items were identified by a majority of the
Black participants as “somewhat” or “very” racist. Thus, the
57

See Sue, Black Americans, supra n. 35, at 329 (“When Blacks are told that
‘people are people’ and that ‘we are all human beings,’ the inherent message is
that their experiences as racial cultural beings are not valid”).
58
Kanter, et al., Preliminary Report, supra n. 25, at 295.

20

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3822628

researchers’ decision to include in the 30 items those that most of
the Black participants did not find to be likely problematic 59 gives
the misleading impression that the Black participants deemed all of
the statements or questions to be microaggressions as well.
Tellingly, items that most of the Black participants deemed
“somewhat or very racist” were statements and questions that are
significantly more facially offensive than a vast majority of the
items that appear on microaggression lists produced by researchers
and used in diversity training programs. For example, 85% of
Black participants unsurprisingly found the statement “you are
smart for a Black guy” “somewhat” or “very racist.” 60 An item
more representative of what appears on training materials would be
the question “can I touch your hair?” directed at a Black woman;
only 27.3% of the Black students found the chance of this being
racist as meaningfully high. Most people, including apparently
most Black people, would apparently deem it to be most likely
simply a genuine expression of appreciation of difference, 61 or
otherwise non-racist, even if sometimes annoying to Black women.
This tendency for researchers to include a handful of
relatively clearly racist items with a high number of much more
ambiguous items gives the impression that they all belong on the
same continuum of racism, albeit perhaps at different locations.
But, again, researchers provide no basis for this implicit notion.
The effect of this is that the inclusion of the relatively problematic
items misleadingly appears to establish that what researchers deem
to be microaggressions, Black participants strongly agree are racist
acts.
Similarly, as for correlation with White racism, the inclusion
of a small number of more likely problematic statements that
actually do correlate with measures of racism, when summed
together with the weaker items, serves to create the impression that
the overall scale correlates with racism.
For example, in Kanter et al., the blatantly hostile statement,
“you are smart for a Black guy,” unsurprisingly correlates -.34
59

To be sure, as Williams argues, “behavior does not have to be offensive to
everyone or even most people to be problematic.” Williams, Clarification, supra
n. 15, at 12. We argue here not that the response “I don’t think of Black people
as Black” is not problematic (we take no stance on that here), but rather that the
responses of the Black participants hardly support the notion that the response
is, by its nature, “rooted in racism.”
60
Kanter, et al., Preliminary Report, supra n. 25, at 295.
61
Ironically, not appreciating difference can also be a microaggression. For
example, according to Sue, et al., stating “there is only one race, the human
race” translates to “color blindness,” which is allegedly a form of racism. Sue, et
al., Everyday Life, supra n. 11, at 276.
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with attitudes toward Black people (spoiler alert: people willing to
say this have more negative attitudes toward Black people). When
Williams declares that “microaggressive acts are rooted in racist
beliefs”62 on the basis of correlations of .36-.45 of the entire
micoraggression scale with prejudice, the problem is clear. The
problem—besides the assumption of causation from correlation—
is that she erroneously interprets the correlation of the total scale
score as evidence that all listed items are microaggressions. The
more ambiguous and facially non-racist items ride on the
correlative coattails of the more blatant, weaseling their way into
seeming conceptual legitimacy as microaggressions when they
don’t belong.
This is damning; why? Because this method appears to be
central in maintaining the seeming legitimacy of the CMC, for few
people would find the CMC useful in any way if it merely
proclaimed the banal: that relatively blatantly problematic
statements can be “microaggressions.” Invidiously, this rather
obviously problematic method fuels the common misimpression
that microaggressions are more pervasive and varied than they
really are. If all 30 questions are interpreted as being “rooted in
racism,” when there is in fact no reason to believe this, the paper
can and will be cited as evidence for the validity of the entirety of
commonly propagated lists of microaggressions.
But, of course, neither the recipient-appraisal method nor the
correlative racism method are what (generally) researchers use. We
suspect this is because neither method is likely to justify
researchers’
claims
about
hidden,
embedded
“metacommunications” that exist independent of how either the
speaker or recipient experience a given statement. Microaggression
researchers simply have not provided a valid basis for concluding
that alleged microaggressions are what researchers claim they are.
And even a charitable reconstruction of methodology cannot hide
the fact that the basis for the researchers’ conclusions about
embedded meanings appears to be an a priori belief in existence of
those embedded meanings.
Although we have focused primarily on a methodological
critique of Kanter, et al., essentially the same problems—
problematic assumptions, small and unrepresentative samples, and
widespread lack of rigorous validation work—characterize work
throughout the social science literature on microaggressions. 63 In
light of this, the current propagative success of the CMC appears to
62
63

Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 12.
See generally Lilienfeld, Strong Claims, supra n. 16.
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be an example of so-called “idea laundering.”
C. Idea Laundering and the Work to be Done
Idea laundering refers to a process that may be growing more
common in academic publishing. It involves the capture of peer
review processes by activists to create the false impression that
certain ideologically and rhetorically useful claims have scientific
credibility, even when, by conventional scientific standards of
rigor, logic, and strong evidence, the claims command no
credence.
The process at its most extreme works like this. Some idea is
presented or even claimed to be true in a book chapter or article,
with little or no evidence. It might even be done reasonably, as
speculation, or it might involve a researcher leaping to an
unjustified conclusion based on weak evidence. The idea, now
published in a peer reviewed journal, can now be cited by other
researchers publishing in other peer reviewed journals as
“evidence” for the validity of the claim. In the total absence of
validity evidence, new researchers can then further cite one
another’s peer reviewed publications in support of the claim.
The CMC appears to be a product of idea laundering because
it is currently ricocheting through psychology scholarship and the
broader culture as if its validity has already been scientifically
established. The problem is, discovery that the emperor has no
clothes (at least not yet) requires the deep dive into primary
sources that most writers are not inclined to, or don’t have time to,
undertake.
Here, studies like the one discussed by Kanter, et al.,
intentionally or not, facilitate the idea laundering that items
researchers and “diversity experts” claim are microaggressions
actually deserve such categorization. However, the study showed
only that strongly bigoted statements reflect prejudice among 118
college students and are perceived as bigoted by 33 Black college
students; and this study is now cited, not as preliminary evidence
requiring vastly more research, but as evidence “indicative of
racial prejudice in offenders.”64
What’s needed is “severe testing.” A severe test is one that
will find flaws in a claim, including alternative explanations, if
they are present. After surviving severe testing, application of
claims to the real world then require additional research that is
plausibly described as an order of magnitude more difficult. For
64

Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 20.
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example, far more validity work is needed to identify which types
of behaviors consistently stem from prejudice and are perceived as
slights.
If microaggressions really are as pervasive as claimed, that
work would then need to be expanded to examine new
manifestations of microaggressions. All of that research would
then need to be replicated, probably first with small convenience
samples, but, eventually, with large nationally representative
samples. Meta-analytic studies would then be needed to evaluate
the overall levels, patterns, and conditions of support for the CMC
in what would then be a large body of research. Furthermore, all of
this work would need to be pre-registered, meaning that, in order
to reduce a slew of potential researcher biases, the hypotheses,
methods, and analyses would all need to be articulated in writing
prior to conducting the study (a practice that has, so far, been
implemented in precious few studies of microaggressions).
Only after the phenomenon is well-understood via this
rigorous scientific manner could researchers begin to apply the
CMC in real world settings with anything resembling scientific
rigor. Work in microaggressions, by these standards, is in its
infancy, and is most definitely not ready for applications in the real
world.
Indeed, while we have focused on the issue of embedded
racist messages, we don’t mean to suggest that this is the only
problem with the CMC; far from it. In fact, we decline to address
these other problems in detail here precisely because they deserve
more focused attention than this paper, given space limitations, can
provide.
For example, CMC researchers regularly claim or suggest that
POC face an onslaught of microaggressions with high frequency.
For example, Sue asserts that minorities don’t “just occasionally
experience racial microaggressions.” Rather, “they are a constant,
continuing, and cumulative experience” in their lives. 65 He also
claims that POC experience microaggressions “daily.” 66 As
Williams puts it, “many if not most microaggressions can be
conceptualized as manifestations of everyday racism.”67 But, when
understood thoroughly, some highly influential research suggests
that this is wrong.
Psychologist Kevin Nadal sought to “measure the
microaggressions that people of color experience in their everyday
65

Sue, et al., Define Reality, supra n. 12, at 277-78.
Sue, et al., Everyday Life, supra n. 11, at 273.
67
Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 7.
66
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lives.”68 POC respondents were provided with examples of subtle
racism, such as “someone assumed I would have a lower education
because of my race,” and were then asked how frequently they had
experienced such discrimination in the prior six months. For a vast
majority of the items. most respondents reported that they either
had not experienced the supposed microaggression in the past six
months at all, or, if they had, did so one to three times. In light of
this result, it’s difficult to characterize microaggressions as
constituting a major social ailment, as the assumption of high
frequency often seems to undergird researchers’ claims about the
supposedly caustic effect microaggressions have on the psyches of
POC.
In short, a vigilant analysis of the research comprising the
CMC reveals its manifold shortcomings, which are so severe as to
raise questions about the precise nature of the project of which the
CMC is a part. One can be forgiven for concluding that the CMC is
not the product of a traditional scientific undertaking wherein
researchers dispassionately identify and soundly verify the
contours of a particular problem, then propose ways to combat that
problem. Rather, one could fairly suspect that the CMC represents
an activism of sort, wherein the problem—widespread subtle
racism—is assumed, such that reinforcement of an activist
narrative is the pre-ordained conclusion. We turn to this next.
II.

Power Dynamics and Methodological Activism

At this point, it should be sufficiently clear that researchers
have not come close to meeting their central premise about
embedded meanings. Researchers rather assume the validity of the
premise, and this assumption is the thread that holds the CMC
together. Without it, the CMC would reduce to simply lists of
items that people do or say that could be inspired by, or interpreted
as, racist. But such a construct would be next to useless for obvious
reasons.
The CMC is sweeping through the social justice zeitgeist
precisely because it claims to be so much more than a warning to
not say facially offensive things, or an admonition to Whites to
think about how they might be misinterpreted by POC before
speaking, and to empathize accordingly. Rather, Sue and others,
using powerful, sweeping, and often unqualified language, claim to
68

Kevin L. Nadal, The Racial and Ethnic Microaggressions Scale (REMS):
Construction, Reliability, and Validity, 58 Journal of Counseling Psychology
470, 471 (2011).
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have revealed something hereto hidden from view. As Sue has put
it, his research seeks to make “the invisible visible.” 69
Such revelations are taken as groundbreaking and important
because they are consistent with critical race theory, which is
popular in the academy and activist communities today. A central
thesis of critical race theory is what might be termed the
“insidiousness tenet,” which is the a priori belief that the subtle
contours of culture, especially those created by language, are
saturated with hidden racism.70
Given their belief in the power of culture to maintain various
groups’ respective social situations, critical race theorists are social
constructionists; that is, they believe that “races are the products of
social thought and relations.”71 “[Critical] discourse analysts . . .
focus on ideas and categories by which our society constructs and
understands race and racism.”72 That is, in choosing what to
problematize, many critical theorists focus on aspects of culture—
often language—that help maintain the current oppressive social
constructions of race via stereotypes, microaggressions, and other
practices that insidiously keep minorities “in their place.” So,
critical race theorists reason, “many of our chains are mental and . .
. we will never be free until we throw off . . . demeaning patterns
of thought and speech.”73
Although the civil rights legislation of the 1960s ended legal
racial discrimination, inequality still persists almost 60 years later.
Why? Many have concluded it must be because of something
secret, subtle, hidden, and underground. But what? By the 1970s,
the social sciences were on a quest to find these supposedly
hidden, camouflaged, or unconscious forms of racism. Those
efforts generated a slew of concepts, such as “modern” 74 or
“symbolic racism,”75 “implicit bias,”76 and “stereotype threat.”77
69

Sue, et al, Black Americans, supra n. 35, at 335. See also generally Sue, et al.,
Everyday Life, supra, n. 11, wherein Sue repeatedly refers to the importance of
making “invisible” racism “visible.”
70
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 91,
159 (2017 3d ed.) (“[R]acism is pervasive, systemic, and deeply ingrained [in
American Society]. . . . The status quo is inherently racist, rather than merely
sporadically or accidentally so.”).
71
Id. at 9.
72
Id. at 140.
73
Id. at 121.
74
McConahay, J. B., Modern racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism
Scale, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, 91 (J. F. Dovidio & S. L.
Gaertner (Eds.) 1986).
75
Kinder, D. R. & Sears, D. O., Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus
Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, 414 (1981).

26

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3822628

Interestingly, just as is the case with microaggressions, each of
these areas have been characterized by a wave of initial enthusiasm
including many publications, followed by critical reviews
highlighting weaknesses, flaws, confounds and alternative
explanations that consistently indicated that the initial enthusiasm
was largely unwarranted.78
The influence of critical race theory on microaggression
research is obvious, and it is often advertised.79 Research on
microaggressions is invaluable to the critical race narrative
because, given the influence of critical race theory on
76

Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K., Measuring
Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J.
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1464 (1998).
77
Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J., Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African-Americans, 69 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, 797 (1995).
78
See Finnigan, K. M. & Corker, K. S., Do Performance Avoidance Goals
Moderate the Effect of Different Types of Stereotype Threat on Women’s Math
Performance? 63 J. OF RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY, 36 (1996); Jussim, L.,
Careem, A., Goldberg, Z., Honeycutt, N., & Stevens, S. T., IAT Scores, Racial
Gaps, and Scientific Gaps, in press, to appear in, Krosnick, J.A., Stark, T. H &
Scott, A.L. (Eds.), THE FUTURE OF RESEARCH ON IMPLICIT BIAS. New York:
Cambridge University Press; Sniderman, P. M. & Tetlock, P. E., Symbolic
Racism: Problems of Motive Attribution in Political Analysis, 42 JOURNAL OF
SOCIAL ISSUES, 129 (1986).
79
Prominent microaggression researchers such as Derald Wing Sue and Kevin
Nadal have nodded to the relevance of critical race theory in their work. Derald
Wing Sue, Jennifer Bucceri, Annie I. Lin, Kevin L. Nadal, and Gina C. Torino,
Racial Microaggressions and the Asian American Experience, Vol. S. ASIAN
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 88, 89 (2009) (“Ever since the civil rights
movement, critical race theory has provided a means for challenging Eurocentric
epistemologies and dominant ideologies such as beliefs in objectivity and
meritocracy that has masked the operation of racism”). See also Shilpa M. Pai
Regan, Book Review: Microaggressions and Traumatic Stress: Theory,
Research, and Clinical Treatment, 10 ASIAN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
PSYCHOLOGY, 373 (2019) (noting that the work of Kevin Nadal, a prominent
microaggression researcher, employs critical race theory); Solorzano, D., Ceja,
M., & Yosso, T. (2000). Critical race theory, racial microaggressions, and
campus racial climate: The Experiences of African American College Students.
69 THE JOURNAL OF NEGRO EDUCATION, 60 (2000); Kristen J. Mills, “It’s
Systemic”: Environmental Racial Microaggressions Experienced by Black
Undergraduates at a Predominantly White Institution, 13 J. OF DIVERSITY IN
HIGHER EDUCATION, 44, 53 (2020) (“[T]heoretical frameworks such as critical
race theory . . . have been used in the study of prejudice, racism, discrimination,
and racial microaggressions . . . .”); Lindsay Pérez Huber and Daniel G.
Solorzano, Visualizing Everyday Racism: Critical Race Theory, Visual
Microaggressions, and the Historical Image of Mexican Banditry, 21
QUALITATIVE INQUIRY, 223, 225 (2015) (noting that the work of Daniel
Solorzano, a microaggression researcher, has drawn “heavily from critical race
theorists”).
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microaggression research, the insidiousness tenet is so often
imbedded in that research. For example, researchers don’t merely
claim that subtle racism has always existed, and that the lessening
of overt racism moves combating subtle racism to the top of the
priority list. Rather, they regularly claim that the subtle racism of
today is the product of old-fashioned overt racism transforming
itself into subtle forms. Here’s Sue, et al. on this score:
Instead of overt expressions of White racial
superiority, research supports the contention that
racism has evolved into more subtle, ambiguous,
and unintentional manifestations in American
social, political, and economic life. The “old
fashioned” type where racial hatred was overt,
direct, and often intentional, has increasingly
morphed into a contemporary form that is subtle,
indirect, and often disguised.80
Similarly, Mercer, et al., claim that “old-fashioned racism has
been replaced by more subtle forms.”81
Recitation of this notion is a virtual introductory staple in
microaggression research articles. When read together with other
presuppositions in the work of some prominent researchers, this
language suggests that subtle racism is a tactic of sorts, not
attributable to the intentionality of individuals, but nevertheless
reflecting a social arrangement diffusedly bent on preserving
White supremacy. For example, Williams argues that
microaggressions are a “manifestation of the aggressive goals of
the dominant group, taught to unwitting actors through . . . social
mechanisms.”82 In this we see tendencies common in critical race
theory: a confidence in a descriptive critical social metaphysics
and a certainty in the critical mind’s (and only the critical mind’s)
ability to identify subtle social evils that others are not equipped to
see.
Microaggression research provides a veneer of scientific
credibility to vested critical premises, as those studies have
statistics, p-values, and reliability coefficients, all useful for
creating the appearance of scientific foundations for assumptions,
so long as one does not examine the methodological details of the
80

Sue, et al., Asian American Experience, supra n. at 88 (emphasis added).
Mercer, S. H., Zeigler-Hill, V., Wallace, M., Development and Initial
Validation of the Inventory of Microaggressions Against Black Individuals, 58
JOURNAL OF COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY, 457, 457 (2011) (emphasis added).
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Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 8.
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studies too closely.
But the undertone of much microaggression research is not
one of caution commensurate with the guardrails normally
imposed by the scientific method. Because of extreme
methodological shortcomings of current microaggression research,
the current perceived integrity of the CMC must be ostensibly
maintained through indulging in significant assumptions, and
through the tactic of concept creep, which both support the
pretense that the CMC reveals as much about social reality as it
claims.
A. Crutch
Assumptions,
Methodological Activism

Concept

Creep,

and

Researchers repeatedly recognize that those who commit
alleged microaggressions might not have the conscious intent to
communicate racism. Researchers deal with this reality simply by
declaring, without basis, that microaggressors’ racism is
unconscious. Certainly, the study by Kanter, et al. did not establish
this (and, to their credit, they described their report as
“preliminary”).
By expanding the normal boundaries of terms, some
researchers claim microaggressions are always committed with a
racist “intent,” even when individualized conscious racist intent is
lacking. Again, Williams argues that microaggressions are “in fact
intentional” because, at the very least, microaggressions are a
“manifestation of the aggressive goals of the dominant group,
taught to unwitting actors through . . . social mechanisms.” 83 As
such, “all microaggressions are meant to cause harm, either by the
individual or society at large, and this is what makes them all
forms of aggression.”84 Even assuming that this use of the concept
of intent is valid, no evidence is provided that “society’s intent” is
to perpetuate racial inequality via listed microaggressions. It
appears to be a creature of critical social metaphysics.
On this score, it is apparent that much of microaggression
research is driven by what appears to be a form of methodological
activism, the ultimate design of which is to advance a critical race
theory narrative of social reality. A primary feature of this
methodological activism is the perception of the scientific method
as illegitimately constraining on “other ways of knowing” by
traditionally marginalized people.
83
84

Id. at 8.
Id at 9 (emphasis added).
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This methodological activism serves the primary role of
bridging empirical gulfs in the research. Researchers invoke the
“experiential reality” of some POC as being somehow
scientifically authoritative; or they reject calls for greater empirical
support with the charge that such demands represent an
epistemological imperialism by critics seeking to, as White males,
hold on to their “power to define reality.”85
For example, in responding to criticisms from colleagues
about the lack of empirical bases for the CMC, Sue has asserted
that “what constitutes evidence is often bathed in the values of the
dominant society. . . .”86 After asserting that “power and privilege
determines the nature of reality,” he criticized his critic for
“applying the accepted scientific principle of skepticism to the
study of microaggressions, which may unintentionally dilute,
dismiss, and negate the lived experience of marginalized groups in
our society.”87
Sue has responded to other critics similarly. For example, he
has accused critics of continuing “to question the racial realities
of” people of color, and working “strongly” to “impose their racial
realities” on them:
As a privileged White male, Thomas [a scholarly
critic] failed to understand how European
Americans have historically had the power to
impose their own reality and deﬁne the reality of
those with lesser power. That is perhaps one of the
reasons why Thomas tried to impose his own reality
so freely in his response.
In other words, Sue responded to the normal scientific skepticism
of his detractors with the implicit argument—made in the
unmistakable spirit of postmodernism,88 which significantly
85

Sue has explained, in his response to critics, that those White critics
traditionally have enjoyed the “power to define reality,” which they enjoy at the
individual “and the institutional and societal levels as well.” Sue, Black
Americans, supra n. 35 at 335.
86
Derald Wing Sue, Microaggressions and “Evidence”: Empirical or
Experiential Reality?, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2017,
170, 170 (2017).
87
Id. at 171. One may wonder what “lived experience” means, given that all
experience is lived. We have not found a satisfactory answer to this question.
88
Joachim I. Krueger, Postmodern Parlor Games, 57 AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGIST, 461 (June/July 2002) (“The postmodernist challenge is to deny
scientific methods’ privileged status as ways of gaining knowledge.”) Brian D.
Haig, Truth, Method, and Postmodern Psychology, 57 AMERICAN
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influences critical race theory—that the application of scientific
rigor was an attempt at “defining reality,” and therefore was a
power play. Thus his critics’ empirical skepticism about some of
Sue’s key claims, was “truly arrogant,” 89 and reflected not a
scientific epistemic caution but rather an attempt to overpower the
“experiential realities” of oppressed people.
Williams takes this same tack in responding to criticism
from psychologist Scott Lilienfeld, who, in the most professional
manner, has incisively and thoroughly critiqued the CMC more
than any other psychologist. Williams accused Lilienfeld of
employing a “racist framework” via his demand for empirical
substantiation, arguing that such “[research] approaches . . . favor
the dominant racial group at the expense of subordinate groups.”90
According to Williams, Lilienfeld’s “research framework could
itself constitute a microaggression.”91 She then chastised Lilienfeld
for not having his critical article reviewed by a “diversity
researcher” to prevent people of color from being “unnecessarily
hurt and offended” by the piece. 92 Lilienfeld—in a remarkably
restrained fashion—replied with further sound objections. How did
Williams respond? Williams accused him of “reinforce[ing]
pathological stereotypes about Africans Americans [Williams is
African-American] [as] being angry, argumentative, and
aggressive.”93 We encourage readers to read the respective papers,
which will reveal that nothing in Lilienfeld’s paper 94 could
reasonably be read to support this accusation.
Importantly, we highlight exchanges such as these not in a
tawdry fashion, that is, not with a design to highlight interesting
but unimportant interpersonal drama for its spectacle value. Rather,
the point is to demonstrate a more pernicious manifestation of
methodological activism, one that should further undermine faith
in much of microaggression research: an aggressive fragility,
combined with an assumed but unjustified moral an epistemic
PSYCHOLOGIST, 457 (2002) (“Postmodern thinkers have mounted a number of
attacks on the widely accepted modern mental outlook known as the
Enlightenment. Gergen’s case for embracing a postmodern psychology
specifically challenges the Enlightenment notions of science and reason as they
are used in modern psychology.”).
89
Id.
90
Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 19.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 21.
93
Williams, Cannot Afford, supra n. 38, at 41.
94
Scott O. Lilienfeld, Microaggression Research and Application:
Clarifications, Corrections, and Common Ground, 15 PERSPECTIVES ON
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, 1 (2019).
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authority, that together serve to stigmatize challengers to the CMC
as either racists or racially insensitive. Examples of this strike us as
power plays. We fear this strongly disincentivizes good-faith and
scientifically sound critiques of claims by microaggression
researchers. It is therefore profoundly anti-scientific. Scientists
must address good-faith criticism of their work on the merits, not
simply by deflection with ad hominem impugnment of the integrity
or decency of the critic.
In sum, it is evident that the disagreement over the
legitimacy of the CMC is not only a conventional disagreement
about whether researchers have sufficiently observed traditional
scientific standards. Rather, in the background—and often in the
foreground—the disagreement is one over what counts as the
legitimate production of knowledge. Concerning to us is this: if
researchers take the view that disagreement about the legitimacy of
the CMC is a struggle between oppressors and oppressed over the
“power to define reality,” how do proponents of the CMC exercise
this power once they obtain it?
B. Language and Power
To paraphrase Nietzsche, when there are no relatively
objective truths, there is only power. Given the critical race theory
prism through which social justice oriented scholars often proceed
with their work, it is fair to ask whether their descriptive emphasis
on the alleged relationship between language, power, and truth
claims also bespeaks something about the nature of the truths they
seek to establish. We don’t doubt that microaggression researchers
want to change society for what they believe to be the better. But,
while we cannot impute bad motives to microaggression
researchers, we also cannot help but notice that both the evolution
of the CMC, and the contentious discussion over its legitimacy,
intentionally or not track quite well a strategic plan to stigmatize
and silence those who disagree with a certain ideological view of
social reality.
The first example of this we’ve already illustrated: researchers
at times respond to reasonable and professional challenges to their
work with pointed charges of implicit racism, and accusations that
critics have committed microaggressions by merely raising
scientific objections to the CMC. But there are other examples.
The choice of the term “microaggression” to describe the
given phenomenon stands out as a term chosen not for its
descriptive accuracy as much as for its insinuative power. The term
“aggression” is a powerful one, with its connotation of hostility,
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intentionality, and less directly but atmospherically, oppression
and domination. Rarely if ever would the lay person label an act
committed with benign conscious intent a form of “aggression.”
But consistent with tactical concept creep, this is the term chosen,
even with the knowledge that use of the term means imputing to
well-meaning actors a state of mind normally associated with
culpability.
Psychologist Jonathan Haidt has written about the
phenomenon of concept creep specifically in the context of
microaggressions. In lamenting that psychology is “becoming a
tribal moral community bound together by moral commitments to
social justice and progressive ideals,” 95 Haidt noted that
psychologists are incentivized “to find new ways in which
members of allegedly victimized groups are harmed by current
practices”;96 hence the creeping expansion of the concept of harm.
Particularly on point, Haidt also described as a “central
innovation[] of microaggression theory” the disposal of a mens rea
predicate for concepts such as “abuse” and “discrimination” “in
ways that make it ever harder for anyone to defend themselves
against ugly moral charges.”97
More possibly telling is how the CMC has evolved in a
manner that would seem to have the effect of silencing
perspectives that are inconsistent with a critical race worldview.
Microaggression
researchers
regularly
declare
to
be
microaggressions statements that reflect mere reasonable moral,
political—and, as we have seen, scientific—disagreements with a
certain social justice perspective. For example, according to
Williams, when a White person says to a Black person “just
because I don’t believe in political correctness doesn’t mean I’m a
racist,” this amounts to a “denial of individual racism,” a
microaggression. Assuming this attribution is logically warranted, 98
the speaker here, according to Williams, is not only guilty of a lack
of self-awareness or simple-mindedness, but rather of an “act of
racism.” The message: a White person who denies that she is a
racist (or who dislikes “political correctness”?) is a racist because
of that denial.
95

Jonathan Haidt, Why Concepts Creep to the Left, 27 PSYCHOLOGICAL
INQUIRY, 40, 41 (2016).
96
Id. at 43.
97
Id. at 44 (emphasis in original).
98
It’s not. This assertion is simply one about a false equivalency: being against
political correctness does not make one racist. One could, without contradiction,
make this assertion and at once admit that they may hold unconscious racist
views.
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Along the same lines, it is apparently a racist microaggression
for a White person to state opposition to affirmative action by
saying “Black people get unfair advantages due to scholarships and
affirmative action,”99 even though this assertion represents one side
in a reasonable disagreement about race and fairness.
Unsurprisingly, some critical race theorists make claims that
parallel this sentiment. For example, Mari Matsuda writes that
“[t]he various implements of racism find their way into the hands
of different dominant-group members. . . . Lower- and middleclass white men might use violence against people of color, while
upper-class white might resort to . . . righteous indignation against
"diversity" and "reverse discrimination." 100
Similarly, consistent with critical race theory, 101 an entire subcategory of microaggressions is devoted to taring and feathering as
unconscious racists those who subscribe to an ethic of
colorblindness. For example, in the chart included in the appendix,
racist microaggressions include statements such as “there is only
one race, the human race,” and “America is a melting pot.” Usually
these phrases are used to celebrate diversity, or to emphasize the
common humanity of people of different races and the progressive
cultural values of many Americans. However, labeling these
assertions microaggressions has the conspicuously convenient
effect of delegitimizing those values and branding as racists those
who may have constructive doubts about the legitimacy of socalled “identity politics.” Some may reasonably, even if
incorrectly, believe that achieving social justice does not require
the relatively high emphasis on identity and difference that
characterizes the currently fashionable critical worldviews of
academics and activists.102 But reasonable disagreement is made
unreasonable when trusted academics, intentionally or not,
construct a device that virtually begs for weaponization against
those with more conservative, moderate, or liberal (as opposed to
99

Kanter, et al., supra n. 24, at 295.
Mari Matsuda, Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech
Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2334 (1989).
101
Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical
Race Theory and Related Scholarship 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 336 (2006) (“A
central theme of Critical Race Theory . . . is to explore the ways in which legal
colorblindness, in supplanting overt legal racial ordering, has . . . blunted efforts
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Delgado & Stefancic, Introduction, supra n. 70, at xvi, xx (“Critical race
theory has exploded . . . into a literature read in departments of education,
cultural studies, English, sociology, comparative literature, political science,
history, and anthropology around the country. . . . and constituencies such as
campus activists”).
100
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“critical” or “radical”) worldviews.
As yet another example, consider that Sue, et al., label as a
racist microaggression the statement “I believe the most qualified
person should get the job.”103 This is forbidden because it reflects
the “myth of meritocracy;” that is, believing that society is largely
meritocratic.104 The “myth of meritocracy” is a driving idea in
critical race theory. Hereto, critical theorists have labeled those
who believe in meritocracy perhaps naïve or uninformed; the CMC
establishes that they are racists. Who benefits from this new truth
in, say, a faculty hiring meeting, wherein a spirited debate might
normally ensue about what ought to count as legitimate candidate
“qualifications”? Might this debate no longer happen if that
university’s administration and broader culture has subscribed to
the CMC?105
Robert Shibley is the Executive Director for the Foundation
for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), an organization that
devotes most of its efforts to combating infringement on free
speech rights of professors and students on college campuses. In a
2016 address, Shibley put it this way:
[W]hoever is making the decisions about what
constitutes a microaggression has been handed an
enormous amount of power to put certain political
beliefs off-limits. There are a lot of people out there
that believe that America is a melting pot, or that
the most qualified person should get the job. It has
not escaped their notice that it is their beliefs and
not others' that have been singled out as harmful.
In short, patterns in the CMC, as well as in researchers’
accusations toward one another, make the enterprise resemble a
system designed to insulate itself from healthy challenge, and to
103

Sue, et al., Everyday Life, supra n. 11, at 274.
Again, the attribution is unwarranted, as one could make this statement and at
once believe that society is far from ideally meritocratic.
105
Speaking of faculty meetings, one vigilant social science professor at
Michigan State, Amy Bonomi, recently warned that other professors were
committing microaggressions during Zoom meetings by, for example, using
opposite-sex wedding photos as background. According to Bonomi, this
expressed unconscious bias, in that “it unintentionally reinforces the idea that
marriage is most fitting between opposite sexes.” Caroline Brooks, There’s an
Unconscious Bias in Virtual Meetings. Here’s How You Can Avoid It,
MSUTODAY,
May
14,
2020,
available
at:
https://msutoday.msu.edu/news/2020/theres-an-unconscious-bias-in-virtualmeetings-heres-how-you-can-avoid-it/
104
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stigmatize and silence interlocutors. The implications of an idea
bear on its legitimacy. This, combined with the scientific
weaknesses of the CMC, suggests that the CMC is little more than
a mechanism to vindicate the intuitive hunches of those who see
racism as more pervasive than others do, and to silence those
whose worldviews that are premised on different hunches.
III.

The Costs of the CMC’s Propagation

What are the costs of educators, scholars, and
administrators accepting the CMC? We are concerned with two
primary categories of costs: first, the harm that propagation of the
CMC might cause to the social harmony between students, and
between students and professors. Second, we are concerned about
harmful influence on legal theory and law.
.
A. The Social Costs
Both of us remember our years of college and graduate
education quite fondly. While the turmoil of youth invariably crept
into those experiences, our minds were supple, and we experienced
the growth that springs from the openness and intellectual
wanderlust of young adulthood. Both of us doubt we will ever
again experience the kind of intellectual and personal growth that
comes from being thrust into the college environment: brilliant
professors ready to tax our minds, peers from different parts of the
country (or world) and with different backgrounds, and a tacit
understanding that we were all there not only to grow but to help
others grow as well.
Given the nature of the college atmosphere, and the
purposes for that atmosphere, it might be second to none among
contexts wherein impressionable minds can be taught to tolerate,
respect, and appreciate difference. For example, a White student
who grew up around very few POC is likely to recalibrate her
worldview and interpretive instincts upon experiencing friendships
and genuine connections with non-White peers. And she is likely
to gain an empathy for those peers that flows from open and
authentic interaction and familiarity with them. Perhaps there are
moments of tension as previously conditioned kinks are ironed out,
but this is an unavoidable part of the process of personal
enrichment through engagement with difference, a process that
depends on the willingness of all involved to meet in the commons
of a shared humanity.
Both of us are from traditionally marginalized groups, and
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we have both faced ugliness from others as a result. But neither of
us remembers being constantly assaulted with microaggressions
while in college, nor do we remember suffering extreme harm
when we did experience them. Perhaps this is because
psychologists had not yet lifted the veil for us, such that we could
not yet see hidden and extremely subtle racism in everyday
encounters with well-intentioned people. Perhaps, but
microaggression researchers have not provided a good basis for us
to believe they have revealed anything of the sort; they merely
claim it, and to us this is not enough.
Given the influence of critical race theory, both of our
respective disciplines—law and psychology—are currently
preoccupied with the notion that racism has gone into hiding, as
overt racism, now unacceptable, lurks in the subtle features of
daily life. While we don’t doubt that racism can and does take
subtle and unconscious forms, we find no basis to conclude that the
nature and extent of this subtle racism are what critically oriented
scholars claim.
Yet, we fear that microaggression researchers via their
alleged insights are increasingly teaching POC that they are under
constant assault; that they are being conditioned to be
constructively offended—that is, offended because they’re taught
that they’re supposed to be—in situations that do not implicate
racism. In other words, we fear they’re being encouraged to
develop what Sue, et al., term a “healthy paranoia” as a result. But
“[i]t is bad enough to suffer real prejudice . . . without having to
suffer imaginary prejudice as well.”106 There is nothing healthy
about the racial paranoia that the CMC might be stoking, as it may
be a recipe for fanning the flames of intergroup conflict without
any noticeable benefits with respect to justice.
And we fear that researchers are teaching White people
that racism permeates virtually everything they do, that their good
intentions don’t matter, and, resultingly, that they should walk on
eggshells when interacting with POC. This strikes us as an
excellent recipe for harming rather than helping interracial
relations. As psychologist Kenneth R. Thomas has stated, “[t]he
restrictions on normal human interaction recommended by Sue and
his associates, if implemented, could have a chilling effect on free
speech and on the willingness of White people, including some
psychologists, to interact with people of color.” 107
106

Edward C. Banfield, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF
OUR URBAN CRISIS 87 (1970).
107
Thomas, supra n. 13, at 274.
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Is this sustainable? In attempting to answer this question,
readers should consider also that this walking-on-eggshells
response by well-intentioned Whites can also be considered a
racist microaggression. According to Williams, this can be an
example of “aversive racism”:
Avoidance, exclusion, and ostracization are all
recognized in psychology as forms of aggression,
and many microaggressions fall into this category.
Interracial anxieties on the part of offenders may
play a role in situations in which would-be
offenders do not want to appear prejudiced and are
motivated by a desire to avoid wrongdoing. As a
result, when in the company of people of color, they
may stumble over their words, say something they
did not intend, say nothing, or leave the situation
entirely. Although wanting to avoid wrongdoing
could be considered well-intentioned behavior, one
must also consider what motivates the offender’s
discomfort and the consequences to the person of
color in that interaction.108
Readers should also consider that an alternative to walking on
eggshells—a speaker’s denial of having committed a
microaggression—is also a microaggression. According to
Williams,: “[i]t is problematic that a typical response to a
microaggression is denial from the offender . . . Also
conceptualized as ‘gaslighting,’109 this is a second microaggression
and only compounds the damage from the initial assault.”
We submit the answer is no: this is not sustainable.
In short, we are concerned that the CMC can be disruptive
to what arguably is the most significant prerequisite to effectively
combat bigotry: interpersonal connection, goodwill, charity, and a
reflexive humanism (as opposed to a reflexive emphasis on
difference). In light of this, we think greater vigilance about the
integrity of knowledge production is needed, especially when it
comes to socially controversial, complicated, and sensitive topics
such as the nature and extent of subtle racism.

108
109

Williams, Clarification, supra n. 15, at 13.
Williams, Cannot Afford, supra n. 38, at 40.
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B. Microaggressions and Law
The Supreme Court is not on the verge of allowing the
government to ban any speech researchers claim to be
microaggressions. So, we don’t mean to suggest that the problem
we identify is currently knocking on constitutional doors; but the
problem is already soliciting in the constitutional neighborhood.
From a legal perspective, our biggest concern are contexts such
as campus speech codes. We are not aware of any campus speech
codes that outright ban and penalize the commission of
microaggressions. However, many colleges and universities now
have “bias reporting systems”110; students are encouraged to report
to authorities anything they witness, whether it happens to them or
someone else, that constitutes some sort of bias. If students learn
that statements like “I believe in merit” or “America is melting
pot” reflect racism, they may well report those making these
statements to authorities, thereby chilling speech even without
direct punishment.
There is a long history of universities pushing—and often
violating—First Amendment boundaries in order to “protect”
students from offensive speech.111 This, combined with the fact that
academic culture is extremely inclined to subscribe to ideas such as
the CMC, provides ample reasons to be concerned that First
Amendment problems are brewing.112
For example, recently University of North Texas professor
Nathaniel Heirs was fired for criticizing the concept of
microaggressions and for failing to attend microaggression training
that would set him straight.113 Apparently, the head of Heirs’
110

FIRE, 2017 Report on Bias Reporting Systems, available at:
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111
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department told Heirs that “he fired him because he criticized . . .
microaggressions fliers and didn’t express ‘honest regret’ about his
actions.”114
As mentioned in the introduction, student protestors at UCLA
have attacked professors for committing the microaggression of
correcting students’ grammar. In the wake of this controversy, a
report advised the administration to engage in tactics to chill
microaggressive speech without banning or punishing it outright
(which the First Amendment clearly would not allow):
We recognize that not all of the incidents of
perceived discrimination of which faculty members
complain will be actionable. Several faculty
members
referenced
the
notion
of
“microaggressions” . . . . Some enhanced
recordkeeping would allow the university to
monitor the number of complaints regarding such
incidents, and therefore to better understand the
campus climate for faculty (and students) of color.
And finally, investigations might deter those who
would engage in such conduct, even if their actions
would likely not constitute a violation of university
policy.115
Students at Emory University have demanded that student
evaluation forms be modified to include a field wherein students
can report instructor microaggressions. As the Emory students
have made clear, questions like this “on the faculty evaluations
would help to ensure that there are repercussions or sanctions for
racist actions performed by professors.” 116 That is, students have
demanded professors be punished for committing acts the
professors likely would not have known—and, likely, had no way
of knowing—would be perceived as racist.
In response to incidents such as these, The Foundation for
Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) has raised concerns:
The inherent subjectivity and elasticity of the
FREEDOM,
April
16,
2020,
available
at:
http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/10968
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Black Students of Emory, Black Students at Emory: List of Demands, THE
EMORY WHEEL, Dec. 2, 2015, available at: https://emorywheel.com/Blackstudents-at-emory-list-of-demands/
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concept of microaggressions make a clear, objective
definition all but impossible in practice. And
without a shared understanding of what speech or
action may constitute a microaggression, students
and faculty run the risk of being reported for speech
protected by the First Amendment that nevertheless
crosses an invisible line, drawn by and known only
to the offended party.117
As FIRE notes, the Emory administration came “perilously close to
saying it will” accede to student demands, and that such demands
are clearly designed “to motivate professors to toe the political
line” in class.118
As another example, the student government at Ithaca College
a few years ago passed a resolution to create an online system to
report microaggressions on campus, with some students pushing
for a system wherein “oppressors”—those who commit
microaggressions—would have their names recorded. 119
To his credit, microaggression researcher Sue has cautioned
against using his work to support punishing individuals who
commit microaggressions. Sue has stated that he “was concerned
that people who use these examples [of microaggressions from his
work] would take them out of context and use them as a [sic]
punitive rather than an exemplary way.”120 But the horse is out of
the barn, and researchers have no control over where it tramples.
Consider also how some critical race theorists frame the nature
and extent of racism in American society, and call for speech
regulations to combat it. While not mentioning microaggressions
specifically, Richard Delgado has written about how:
[r]acism's victims become sensitized to its subtle
117
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118
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Evan Popp, IC SGA Passes Bill to Create System to Report
Microaggressions, March 18, 2015, available at: https://theithacan.org/news/icsga-passes-bill-to-create-system-to-report-microaggressions/ (“The bill does not
currently state that the names of people accused of committing microaggressions
will be reported. While Pradhan [the bill’s sponsor] said she believes the names
of alleged offenders should be reported, she said there could be possible legal
barriers.”).
120
Fernanda Zamudio-Suarez, What Happens When Your Research Is Featured
on ‘Fox & Friends’, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, June 29, 2016,
available
at:
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nuances and code-words—the body language,
averted gazes, exasperated looks, terms such as
"you people," "innocent Whites," "highly qualified
Black," "articulate" and so on—that, whether
intended or not, convey racially charged
meanings.121
It should be clear at this point that what Delgado was describing in
1992 were microaggressions (and, incidentally, this quote should
also make clear the fact that the critical race conception of the
nature and extent of racism has most certainly spread to other
fields, such as psychology). Delgado suggested that First
Amendment doctrine ought to bend to accommodate, for example,
campus speech codes that would “protect lowly and vulnerable
members of our society, such as isolated, young Black
undergraduates.”122
Delgado is not alone. Calls for current free speech doctrine
to bend to allow for the “protection” of POC from “hate speech” is
a common feature in critical race theory. For example, prominent
critical race theorist Mari Matsuda has called for “formal criminal
sanction” for “racist speech.”123 Ioanna Tourkochoriti has argued,
“drawing on critical race theory . . . that the harm caused by [hate]
speech is significant enough to justify limitations.”124
To be fair, such scholars are usually referring to speech that
is more blatantly and aggressively racist than microaggressions
usually are. But, three realities are, we fear, problematically
converging. First, critical race theory is increasingly enjoying
mainstream status in academic work on race, race discourse in the
media, and in the social justice zeitgeist. 125 Second, critical
theorists generally subscribe to the postmodern presupposition
about the subtle role of discourse in shaping reality and identity. 126
121
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Third, the social sciences—heavily influenced by critical theory—
are increasingly “uncovering” ever more ways that subtle aspects
of daily life, such as discourse norms, help further entrench an
unjust status quo. The ostensibly empirical basis that the latter
phenomenon provides the first two portends, we fear, increasing
demands for the policing of ever more subtle aspects of human
interaction. As discussed above, we’ve already seen this beginning
to happen on college campuses with regard to microaggressions.
CONCLUSION
Importantly, this article only scratches the surface
regarding potential problems with the CMC. We have chosen to
focus on what we see as the most fundamental weakness of the
CMC, the problem of defining an act as a microaggression in the
first place. But, as Scott Lilienfeld has incisively pointed out in his
thorough detailing of the CMC’s potential problems, there are
other challenges CMC researchers face, such as the possible
unreliability of their conclusions about the harms microaggressions
allegedly cause.127 Thus, our critique should be interpreted as
introductory rather than exhaustive.
When scientists speak, people listen, even if the science is
unscientific. If scientists are going to declare a broad and
indeterminate number of acts inherently subtly racist, and a critical
mass of those in positions of power and influence are ideologically
inclined to believe them, it is imperative that the claims not be
grossly exaggerated and that they be grounded in solid scientific
methodology. The current CMC fails in this regard. After critical
REV. 165, 174 (2007) (“The postmodern contention is that there is no coherent
self that lies outside the disparate social discourses that inevitably construct
us.”); Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV.
935, 953 (1999) (“The postmodern prong of critical race theory embraces the
socially constructed nature of identity categories.”); Delgado, Introduction,
supra n. 70, at 121 (noting the postmodern influence on critical race theory, and
stating “many of our chains are mental and . . . we will never be free until we
throw off . . . demeaning patterns of thought and speech.”); Elusive Quest:
Reflecting on Bell and Brown, Randall O. Westbrook, 34 HARV. J. RACIAL &
ETHNIC JUST. 117, 117 (2018) (“[Derrick] Bell was a founder of Critical Race
Theory (CRT), a set of theories developed to combat the subtler forms of racism
. . . .”); Delgado, Outsider, supra n. 123, at 1283 (emphasizing the “subtle
nuances” and “code-words” for racism, and asserting that “[s]ome refuse to see
racism in acts that trigger suspicion in the mind of any person of color.”).
127
Lilienfeld, Strong Claims, supra n. 16, at 159 (asserting that there is
“minimal research evidence” for the assertion that microaggressions
meaningfully adversely impact recipients, and thus that “the unqualified causal
claims of [CMC] proponents are insufficiently justified.”).
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analysis, the CMC appears to be a project in attempting to
retroactively validate initial ideological hunches; or, at best, to give
voice to POC by substituting the scientific method for the
perceptions of some of them. Whichever it may be, it is clear that,
at this point, nobody—neither diversity administers, academics, or
journalists—should take currently propagated lists of
microaggressions as representative of anything meaningful. We
assert this not to be gratuitously insulting to CMC researchers, but
to forestall the harms that the CMC we fear may cause.
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Tool: Recognizing Microaggressions and the Messages They Send
	
  

Microaggressions are the everyday verbal, nonverbal, and environmental slights, snubs, or insults, whether intentional or
unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative messages to target persons based solely upon their
marginalized group membership (from Diversity in the Classroom, UCLA Diversity & Faculty Development, 2014). The
first step in addressing microaggressions is to recognize when a microaggression has occurred and what
message it may be sending. The context of the relationship and situation is critical. Below are common themes to
which microaggressions attach.

	
  
THEMES

MICROAGGRESSION EXAMPLES

Alien in One’s Own Land
When Asian Americans, Latino
Americans and others who look
different or are named differently
from the dominant culture are
assumed to be foreign-born

•
•
•
•

•

Ascription of Intelligence
Assigning intelligence to a person
of color or a woman based on
his/her race/gender

•
•
•
•

Color Blindness
Statements that indicate that a
White person does not want to or
need to acknowledge race.

•
•
•
•
•

Criminality/Assumption of
Criminal Status
A person of color is presumed to
be dangerous, criminal, or deviant
based on his/her race.

•

•
•
•

Denial of Individual
Racism/Sexism/Heterosexism
A statement made when bias is
denied.

•
•

Myth of Meritocracy
Statements which assert that race
or gender does not play a role in
life successes, for example in
issues like faculty demographics.

•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•

“Where are you from or where were you born?”
“You speak English very well.”
“What are you? You’re so interesting looking!”
A person asking an Asian American or Latino
American to teach them words in their native
language.
Continuing to mispronounce the names of students
after students have corrected the person time and
time again. Not willing to listen closely and learn
the pronunciation of a non-English based name.
“You are a credit to your race.”
“Wow! How did you become so good in math?”
To an Asian person, “You must be good in math,
can you help me with this problem?”
To a woman of color: “I would have never guessed
that you were a scientist.”
“When I look at you, I don’t see color.”
“There is only one race, the human race.”
“America is a melting pot.”
“I don’t believe in race.”
Denying the experiences of students by
questioning the credibility /validity of their stories.
A White man or woman clutches his/her purse or
checks wallet as a Black or Latino person
approaches.
A store owner following a customer of color around
the store.
Someone crosses to the other side of the street to
avoid a person of color.
While walking through the halls of the Chemistry
building, a professor approaches a post-doctoral
student of color to ask if she/he is lost, making the
assumption that the person is trying to break into
one of the labs.
“I’m not racist. I have several Black friends.”
“As a woman, I know what you go through as a
racial minority.”
To a person of color: “Are you sure you were being
followed in the store? I can’t believe it.”

“I believe the most qualified person should get the
job.”
“Of course he’ll get tenure, even though he hasn’t
published much—he’s Black!”
“Men and women have equal opportunities for
achievement.”
“Gender plays no part in who we hire.”
“America is the land of opportunity.”
“Everyone can succeed in this society, if they work
hard enough.”
“Affirmative action is racist.”

MESSAGE
You are not a true American.
You are a perpetual foreigner in
your own country.
Your ethnic/racial identity makes
you exotic.

People of color are generally not
as intelligent as Whites.
All Asians are intelligent and good
in math/science.
It is unusual for a woman to have
strong mathematical skills.
Assimilate to the dominant culture.
Denying the significance of a
person of color’s racial/ethnic
experience and history.
Denying the individual as a
racial/cultural being.
You are a criminal.
You are going to steal/you are
poor, you do not belong.
You are dangerous.

I could never be racist because I
have friends of color.
Your racial oppression is no
different than my gender
oppression. I can’t be a racist. I’m
like you.
Denying the personal experience
of individuals who experience
bias.
People of color are given extra
unfair benefits because of their
race.
The playing field is even so if
women cannot make it, the
problem is with them.
People of color are lazy and/or
incompetent and need to work
harder.

Adapted from Sue, Derald Wing, Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Race, Gender and Sexual Orientation, Wiley & Sons, 2010.
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Tool: Recognizing Microaggressions and the Messages They Send
	
  

	
  

	
  

THEMES
Pathologizing Cultural
Values/Communication Styles
The notion that the values and
communication styles of the
dominant/White culture are
ideal/”normal”.

•

•
•
•

Second-Class Citizen
Occurs when a target group
member receives differential
treatment from the power group;
for example, being given
preferential treatment as a
consumer over a person of color.

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•
Sexist/Heterosexist Language
Terms that exclude or degrade
women and LGBT persons.

•
•
•
•
•

Traditional Gender Role
Prejudicing and Stereotyping
Occurs when expectations of
traditional roles or stereotypes are
conveyed.

•

•
•
•
•
•

MICROAGGRESSION

MESSAGE

To an Asian, Latino or Native American: “Why are
you so quiet? We want to know what you think. Be
more verbal.” “Speak up more.”
Asking a Black person: “Why do you have to be so
loud/animated? Just calm down.”
“Why are you always angry?” anytime race is
brought up in the classroom discussion.
Dismissing an individual who brings up race/culture
in work/school setting.
Faculty of color mistaken for a service worker.
Not wanting to sit by someone because of his/her
color.
Female doctor mistaken for a nurse.
Being ignored at a store counter as attention is
given to the White customer.
Saying “You people…”
An advisor assigns a Black post-doctoral student to
escort a visiting scientist of the same race even
though there are other non-Black scientists in this
person’s specific area of research.
An advisor sends an email to another work
colleague describing another individual as a “good
Black scientist.”
Raising your voice or speaking slowly when
addressing a blind student.
In class, an instructor tends to call on male
students more frequently than female ones.

Assimilate to dominant culture.

Use of the pronoun “he” to refer to all people.
Being constantly reminded by a coworker that “we
are only women.”
Being forced to choose Male or Female when
completing basic forms.
Two options for relationship status: married or
single.
A heterosexual man who often hangs out with his
female friends more than his male friends is
labeled as gay.
When a female student asks a male professor for
extra help on an engineering assignment, he asks
“What do you need to work on this for anyway?”
“You’re a girl, you don’t have to be good at math.”
A person asks a woman her age and, upon hearing
she is 31, looks quickly at her ring finger.
An advisor asks a female student if she is planning
on having children while in postdoctoral training.
Shows surprise when a feminine woman turns out
to be a lesbian.
Labeling an assertive female committee chair/dean
as a “b____,” while describing a male counterpart
as a “forceful leader.”

Leave your cultural baggage
outside.
There is no room for difference.

People of color are servants to
Whites. They couldn’t possibly
occupy high status positions.
Women occupy nurturing
positions.
Whites are more valued
customers than people of color.
You don’t belong. You are a
lesser being.

A person with a disability is
defined as lesser in all aspects of
physical and mental functioning.
The contributions of female
students are less worthy than the
contributions of male students.
Male experience is universal.
Female experience is invisible.
LGBT categories are not
recognized.
LGBT partnerships are invisible.
Men who do not fit male
stereotypes are inferior.
Women are less capable in math
and science.
Women should be married during
child-bearing ages because that is
their primary purpose.

Women are out of line when they
are aggressive.

Adapted from Sue, Derald Wing, Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Race, Gender and Sexual Orientation, Wiley & Sons, 2010.
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